There is no cold zone: The hazardous materials zone model and mass terrorism chemical weapon events

Scot Phelps, JD, MPH, CEM, CBCP

doi:10.5055/jem.2006.0022

Authors

Scot Phelps, JD, MPH, CEM, CBCP

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5055/jem.2006.0022

Keywords:

chemical weapons, responders, zone model, personal protective equipment

Abstract

This study examined 70 after action reports (AARs) from full-scale chemical weapons exercises held in large cities across the United States by the Office of Domestic Preparedness’ Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program (CWIRP). These exercises were held to determine that, if “hot, warm, and cold” zones were established, did victims stay in the hot zone until they could be decontaminated, and did responders observe the hot-warm-cold zone demarcations? Only 35 percent of reports indicated that responders utilized the zone concept, less than 20 percent of reports indicated that victims were compliant with the zone model, and less than 15 percent of reports indicated that responders properly observed the zones that were created. Results indicate that use of the zone model for a mass terrorism chemical weapons attack (MTCWA) is not well utilized, and that responders operating in the cold zone need personal protective equipment.

Author Biography

Scot Phelps, JD, MPH, CEM, CBCP

Paramedic, Emergency & Disaster Management Program, Graduate School of Public Administration, Metropolitan College of New York, New York City, New York.

References

The Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program was funded by the US Domestic Preparedness Initiative as part of the 1997 Nunn-Luger-Domenici legislation. The program produced a variety of reports, including Guidelines for Mass Casualty Decontamination During a Terrorist Chemical Agent Incident, Guidelines for Cold Weather Mass Decontamination During a Terrorist Chemical Agent Incident, and Risk Assessment of Using Firefighter Protection Ensemble With Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Rescue During a Terrorism Chemical Agent Incident.

Stilp R, Bevelacqua A: Emergency Medical Response to Hazardous Material Incidents. New York: Delmar Publishers, 1997, 18-19.

The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry’s 1997 Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance Report revealed that no hazardous materials release from either a fixed site or transportation spill had more than six injuries, the mode was one victim. Available at www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HS/HSEES/annual97.html. Accessed August 18, 2005.

Smithson AE, Levy LA: Chapter Three: Rethinking the Lessons of Tokyo from Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response. Washington, DC: The Stimson Foundation, 2000.

Ibid.

Lessons Learned Information Shared web site. Available at www.llis.dhs.gov. Accessed August 18, 2005.

Agents included hydroflouric acid, nerve agents, blister agents, chlorine truflouride, hydrochloric acid.

Stilp R, Bevelacqua A: Emergency Medical Response to Hazardous Material Incidents. New York: Delmar Publishers, 1997, 18.

Currance P, Bronstein AC: Hazardous Materials for EMS: Practices and Procedures. St Louis, MO.: 1999, 96-97.

Quarantelli E: The Nature and Conditions of Panic. American Journal of Sociology. 1954; 60: 265-275. Available at www.udel.edu/DRC/preliminary/pp283.pdf. Accessed August 18th, 2005.

For example, in New York City fewer than 25 ambulances have equipment necessary to operate in the warm zone. New York City Coun cil, Committee on Fire and Criminal Justice Services, April 5th, 2005. Available at http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache: EyFDVh3 IsDUJ:www.nyccouncil.info/issues/report_act.cfm%3Fmtfile%3DInt%25200586-2005+haztac+ambulance&hl=en. Accessed August 18th, 2005.

In the ODP Chemical Weapons Full-Scale Exercise Program, responders were contaminated in 52 of the exercises, not contaminated in eight, and there was no explicit mention of rescuer contamination in 11.

It is possible that victims were told to by exercise controllers to try and leave the scene. It is also possible that victims were coached to stay and be cooperative.

Smithson AE, Levy LA: Chapter Three: Rethinking the Lessons of Tokyo from Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response. Washington, D.C.: The Stimson Foundation, 2000.

Ibid.

Lake WA, Fedele PD, Marshall SM: Guidelines for Mass Casualty Decontamination During a Terrorist Chemical Agent Incident. US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command. January 2000.

For example, in the ODP Chemical Weapons Full-Scale Exercise Program, 50 AARs reported that EMS workers had NO level “C” personal protective equipment (chemical protective suit, chemical protective respirator, chemical resistant gloves, and boots), while only six reported that they had sufficient personal protective equipment to respond to a chemical weapons event.

Risk Assessment of Using Firefighter Protection Ensemble With Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Rescue During a Terrorism Chemical Agent Incident. US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command. June 2003.

Smithson AE, Levy LA: Chapter Three: Rethinking the Lessons of Tokyo from Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response. Washington, D.C.: The Stimson Foundation, 2000.