Analyzing after-action reports from Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina: Repeated, modified, and newly created recommendations

Claire Connolly Knox, PhD

doi:10.5055/jem.2012.0135

Authors

Claire Connolly Knox, PhD

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5055/jem.2012.0135

Keywords:

Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Katrina, after-action reports, communication, emergency management

Abstract

Thirteen years after Hurricane Andrew struck Homestead, FL, Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast of Mississippi, Alabama, and southeastern Louisiana. Along with all its destruction, the term “catastrophic” was redefined. This article extends the literature on these hurricanes by providing a macrolevel analysis of The Governor’s Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee Final Report from Hurricane Andrew and three federal after-action reports from Hurricane Katrina, as well as a cursory review of relevant literature. Results provide evidence that previous lessons have not been learned or institutionalized with many recommendations being repeated or modified. This article concludes with a discussion of these lessons, as well as new issues arising during Hurricane Katrina.

Author Biography

Claire Connolly Knox, PhD

Assistant Professor/Emergency Management and Homeland Security Program Coordinator, School of Public Administration, University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida

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